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Who dares to say that the emperor has no clothes, and if  you do, what 
consequences can you expect? How does a system craft legitimacy, and where 
are the limits of  power? How did the Communist Party in Hungary manage 
to win, in addition to the support of  Soviet tanks, the support of  a significant 
proportion of  the Hungarian population, without actually having to use force 
in every case? How did they manage to convince people of  the myth that the 
Communists were building the best of  all possible worlds, the workers’ state, 
and how did they shatter this very myth? Mark Pittaway, a historian who staked 
out his place in Hungarian and international historiography as a legal scholar 
dealing first and foremost with the working class of  the socialist era (and who 
died tragically young), seeks answers to these important questions.
The posthumously published monograph by Mark Pittaway (1971–2010)1 is 
the result of  fifteen years of  research. I first met Pittaway in 1995 in the Trade 
Union Archives in Rózsa Street, Budapest. He was sitting behind a wall of  boxes 
containing documents and studying innumerable piles of  dusty papers. After 
having completed his bachelor’s thesis on Venice at the time of  the Renaissance, 
he entered the doctoral program at the University of  Liverpool, where he 
pursued an interest in the history of  the working class in Hungary. For many 
people working in or around the archives in the Hungarian countryside, this 
Englishman was something of  an exotic rarity. He was one of  the few non-
Hungarian historians who learned Hungarian to a high degree of  proficiency 
and, after having read the relevant Hungarian secondary literature, did original 
research in archives very far from the beaten track. His monograph is based 
on a remarkable wealth of  sources and his pioneering manner of  approaching 
the subject does a great deal to compensate for methodological lacunae in the 
secondary literature. But his contribution is valuable first and foremost because 
of  the model he adopts, which rejects the totalitarian paradigm (which has 
become so prevalent in contemporary historiography), a model he was among 
1  The book was already in preparation at the time of  Pittaway’s death. The final revisions and editing, 
without which it could not have been published, were done by Nigel Swain.
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the first to introduce with his narrative of  the history of  the Hungarian working 
class in 1944–1958.
The essence of  this model lies in the fact that the totalitarian state, which 
in general is depicted as omnipresent and omnipotent, is merely one of  the 
agents of  history, and one the tools of  which are in fact surprisingly limited. 
From the perspective of  legitimacy, the attendants of  the system (ranging from 
the secretary general to the average party member) influenced the prevailing 
attitudes towards the state (whether is wins acceptance or not) no more than 
the masses who, in the totalitarian paradigm, are depicted—misleadingly—as 
powerless and oppressed. In Pittaway’s narrative the process of  the creation 
of  the socialist state is one of  the most important questions, and it is closely 
intertwined with the question of  how the authorities prompted or persuaded 
Hungarian society to accept the new rules on which the system rested. 
The question of  the treatment of  the working class became one of  the 
most important elements of  the legitimacy of  the Communist Party after World 
War II, very much like the use of  nationalist rhetoric.2 Pittaway considers it 
important to note that the socialist system itself  never gained legitimacy (p.4). 
Yet many of  the motifs of  the creation of  the socialist state were accepted, 
and they gave some legitimacy to a system that used force. Furthermore, the 
possibility of  the use of  force became a norm in many cases. In other words 
while the socialist regime was not necessarily seen as legitimate, neither was it 
seen as diabolically evil by many, however unpleasant this may be to admit in 
hindsight.
The monograph cautiously (sometimes overcautiously) guides the reader 
through the story of  the creation by Communist politicians who enjoyed minimal 
support of  a party of  the masses that had palpable support among workers, to the 
detriment of  the Social Democratic Party. And later, as a dramatic continuation 
of  the story, the same politicians rapidly lost this support on the national and 
local levels when they began to create the “workers’ state” (to which Pittaway 
refers ironically in his title) by introducing “the building of  the socialist system,” 
the “rationalization” of  production, and the system of  quotas. After 1956, in the 
new social climate, the regime under the leadership of  János Kádár was again 
compelled to use tools to win legitimacy, since it was not possible to work and 
wield power in everyday life with minimal support in the shadow of  tanks or at 
2  Cf. Martin Mevius, Agents of  Moscow: the Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of  Socialist Patriotism, 
1941–1953 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
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“gun point.”3 In contrast, according to the totalitarian paradigm, the state used, 
first and foremost, force to exert its power over workers in heavy industry. In 
1956 Hungarian society (especially the workers) rose up against the regime, and 
this was met with new repressive measures.4 The totalitarian paradigm suggests, 
inaccurately, that no one in the large industrial cities voted for the Communists 
of  his or her own volition in 1945 and 1947 and that no one was in fact a party 
member. It suggests that the Communist idiom was used by members of  society 
only as a response to the orders of  the regime and only by people who sought in 
ever larger numbers to promote their own individual interests.
Pittaway’s approach is refreshing not only because of  its novelty in 
comparison with the totalitarian paradigm, but also because it sheds light (on the 
national and local level) on the process whereby the Communist Party managed, 
through the use of  populist rhetoric, to gain credibility and then to lose it entirely. 
The new system after 1956 owed its relative stability not only to the Soviet tanks, 
but also the “subjects” who as agents of  history themselves influenced the 
rules of  the game in everyday life. It is particularly worthwhile to emphasize 
the interpretation of  1956 according to which, from the perspective of  the 
politicians involved, the Revolution can be seen as an attempt to gain legitimacy, 
and not simply as an uprising. From this perspective the motives and the roles 
played by Communist politicians in 1956 are more comprehensible, as are the 
functions of  the workers’ councils as negotiators in the course of  the reprisals 
and the consolidation of  the Kádár system. In this story, the workers’ councils 
were not bastions of  a self-organized revolutionary force that was realizing self-
government among workers,5 but rather the vehicles of  an attempt to further 
the legitimacy of  the Kádár regime, an attempt initiated both from above and 
below. Thus they offer a perspective from which to discern the consolidation of  
the Kádár system not simply from below, but also from the viewpoint of  the 
negotiations and compromises that were made at the local level. In Pittaway’s 
3  See Gyula Kozák and Adrienne Molnár, eds., “Szuronyok hegyén nem lehet dolgozni!”: válogatás 1956-
os  munkástanács-vezetők  visszaemlékezéseiből [“You Can Not Work at Gun-Point!”: A Selection from the 
Memoires of  Leaders of  the 1956 Workers’ Councils] (Budapest: Századvég–1956-os Intézet, 1993).
4  Cf. Gyula Belényi, Az állam szorításában: az ipari munkásság társadalmi átalakulása Magyarországon, 1945–
1965 [In the Vice of  the State: The Social Transformation of  the Industrial Working Class in Hungary, 
1944–1965] (Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2009).
5  Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of  Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958); Bill Lomax, ed., 
Hungarian Workers’ Councils in 1956 (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 1990); Bill Lomax, Hungary 
1956 (London: Allen and Busby, 1976); Tamás Krausz, “Az 1956-os munkástanácsokról” [On the 1956 
Workers’ Councils], Eszmélet 18, no. 72 (Winter 2006): 32–38.
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narrative, they have a similar function to the trade union committees of  1945: 
their stories shed light on how the new system was able to win acceptance on the 
shop floor. In this interpretation, the trade union committees and the workers’ 
councils did not represent “union democracy” or “workers’ self-government.” 
Rather, the Communists used them to promote acceptance of  their goals among 
workers in heavy industry in 1945 and the fall of  1956.
There is a long tradition of  historical and sociological scholarship on 
workers in heavy industry in Hungary.6 Though the subject has not been given 
much attention among scholars since the change of  regimes in 1989, over the 
course of  the last decade more and more historians have begun to study it in part 
because of  the influence of  Pittaway’s contribution.7 His was not the first such 
study to examine the endeavors of  the Communists to win legitimacy among 
workers in the region.8 Pittaway continuously reflects on the theses that can be 
found in the international secondary literature on the subject, and his monograph 
reinterprets and enlarges on the conclusions of  E. P. Thompson’s fundamental 
work on the creation of  the English working class.9 He is thoroughly familiar 
with the subject, as evidenced by the fact that he wrote a separate comparative 
volume on the social history of  the socialist bloc that has become obligatory 
reading at universities throughout the world and one of  the best summaries of  
6  Miklós Lackó, Ipari  munkásságunk  összetételének  alakulása.  1867–1949  [The Transformation of  
the Composition of  our Industrial Working Class] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1961); György Litván, ed., 
Magyar  munkásszociográfiák  [Hungarian Workers’ Sociographies] (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi 
Intézete, 1974); István Kemény, Velük nevelkedett a gép [The Machine was Reared with Them] (Budapest: 
Művelődéskutató Intézet, 1990); Gábor Gyáni, Bérkaszárnya  és  nyomortelep:  a  budapesti  munkáslakás  múltja 
[Tenement Building and Slum: The History of  Workers’ Lodgings in Budapest] (Budapest: Magvető, 1992); 
László Varga, Az elhagyott tömeg: tanulmányok 1950–1956-ról [The Abandoned Crowd: Studies on 1950–1956] 
(Budapest: Cserépfalvi–Budapest Főváros Levéltára, 1994).
7  Belényi, Az állam szorításában; Sándor Horváth, László Pethő and Eszter Zsófia Tóth, Munkástörténet, 
munkásantropológia [Labor History, Labor Anthropology] (Budapest: Napvilág, 2003); Eszter Zsófia Tóth, 
“Puszi Kádár  Jánosnak”: munkásnők  élete  a Kádár-korszakban mikrotörténeti megközelítésben [“Kisses for János 
Kádár”: The Lives of  Working Women in the Kádár Era, from the Perspective of  a Micro-historical 
Analysis] (Budapest: Napvilág, 2007); the special issue “Labor of  Postwar Central and Eastern Europe” of  
the journal International Labor and Working-Class History 68, Fall (2005); and among the most recent works: 
Eszter Bartha, Alienating Labour: Workers on the Road from Socialism to Capitalism in East Germany and Hungary 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2013).
8  Two important works that influenced Pittaway in his choice of  topics: Alf  Lüdtke: Eigen-Sinn. 
Fabrikalltag, Arbeitserfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus. (Hamburg: Ergebnisse-Verlag, 
1993); Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers  and Communists,  1945–1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997).
9  Edward Palmer Thompson, The Making of  the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1963).
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the postwar history of  the region.10 He boldly and confidently transgresses the 
borders established by political history. For instance, in his assessment in many 
of  the social processes in Eastern Europe World War II did not constitute a 
caesura, and he traces with similar confidence the threads of  continuity and 
discontinuity in the social history of  the working class. According to Pittaway, 
1945, 1948, and 1956 constituted pivotal moments only to the extent that they 
prompted changes in the political views of  the workers of  Újpest, Tatabánya, or 
Zala County. Thus, paradoxically his book also examines how the Kádár system 
came into being, the antecedents to it, and the processes whereby it was able to 
consolidate its power (and from this perspective 1945 and 1947 were as much 
antecedents as 1953). 
Pittaway does not attempt to establish consensus in the debates regarding 
the debates on modernization,11 nor does he bother attempting to reconcile the 
oppositions of  the “movements” of  “political” and “social history”. He puts 
these debates in parentheses. He examines simply the fluctuating legitimacy of  
the Communists and the system and the ways in which actors at various levels of  
power and in various social spaces influenced one another. The subject at hand 
(political support, or lack thereof) can be understood as political history, but in 
the course of  his study Pittaway uses all of  the methods and sources that a social 
or cultural historian would use.
The task Pittaway sets for himself  is not easy. Even the question of  the 
precise meaning of  the term legitimacy can be problematic, not to mention the 
issue of  how one can use sources that for the most part were produced by the 
regime itself  to assess the amount of  support it actually had in the factories. 
For this reason, the study of  the limits of  power and the various forms of  
support requires new tools. Anyone who knew Pittaway may well be surprised 
by the methodological rigor with which he constructs his narrative. He read an 
enormous amount about the living conditions and everyday lives of  the working 
class in Hungary, but the reader can glimpse this vast knowledge only through 
the very small, carefully selected stories he provides. A serious task demands a 
serious scholar. The monograph is not the work of  Mark, who loved to recount 
captivating stories of  the working class, but rather Pittaway, the highly disciplined 
scholar, who writes with none of  the irony or humor so distinctive of  Mark. It 
10 Mark Pittaway, Eastern Europe 1939–2000 (London: Arnold, 2004).
11 Michael David-Fox, “Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism. On Recent Debates in Russian and 
Soviet History,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 54 (2006): 535–55.
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is a dramatic story without catharsis in which every anecdote has an important 
function. 
The form of  the narrative, which is told chronologically and is set in three 
different industrial(izing) settlements (Újpest, Tatabánya and Zala county), 
enables Pittaway to portray the reactions of  the workers as rational. At the 
beginning of  each chapter he describes the political context in Hungary, which 
presumably is largely unfamiliar to the average non-Hungarian reader, and then 
goes into the “depths,” the factories and the workshop floors. Újpest, which 
had a long history as an industrialized settlement, Tatabánya, which had grown 
administratively to absorb nearby mining colonies and had been elevated to the 
status of  a city, and Zala county (and within Zala county the area around the city 
of  Letenye), which had only begun to serve as a home to the oil industry but 
was otherwise largely dependent on agriculture, provide in and of  themselves 
an opportunity for comparison. As the narrative progresses, it seems to have 
a diverse array of  implications, and the theses are so logical that at times it is 
almost disquieting.
The differences between imagined industrial workers (the notion of  the 
worker as used in the idiom crafted by the Communists) and real industrial 
workers are always present in Pittaway’s analyses. He cites a 1958 report of  a 
party committee to make these differences palpable. At the dawn of  the Kádár 
era, when, given the significant rise in wages and the arrests, hardly anyone in 
the factories in the city would have considered going on strike, Lajos Kelemen, a 
party secretary in Kőbánya,12 openly contended—no doubt to the astonishment 
of  many—that the emperor had no clothes, for the workers, the workers’ state 
was alas not the best of  all possible worlds. “Part of  the working class simply 
doesn’t agree with us. They just do not accept this system.” (p.14) His words 
were recorded, and they were met with replies. But Kelemen was not punished, 
rather his statement was used to further the consolidation of  the new system. 
For a time the king acknowledged that he had no clothes, which considerably 
increased his credibility. The legitimacy of  the Kádár system rested to a great 
extent on its efforts to distance itself  from the Rákosi regime, which from the 
perspective of  the hardships faced by the industrial working class meant that 
after 1956 the origins of  every problem were traced back to the early 1950s. 
Indeed it may well have seemed that Kádár himself  had risen to power in order 
to break with the past and see that justice be done. 
12 Kőbánya was a traditionally industrial district of  Budapest.
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 The first chapter of  the book begins in March 1944 with the occupation 
of  the country by the German army and narrates the case studies that took 
place in the three regions up until November 1945, examining what the workers 
themselves sought (primarily stability) and what they were given or at least 
hoped to be given by the Communists (and this differed in each of  the three 
areas). Pittaway’s approach sheds light on methodological problems as well, 
since the historian is compelled to reply for the most part on the minutes of  
party meetings, official reports regarding the prevailing mood (hangulatjelentés), 
and newspaper articles when drawing conclusions —tentatively—on the 
expectations of  workers. In any event Újpest seems to have been the only 
place—and not because of  the Újpest partisans (p.31)—where communism was 
not perceived simply as an exotic import brought by the Soviet army. In the case 
of  Tatabánya, in contrast, Pittaway traces the first successes of  the Communists 
back to the power vacuum left after the fall of  the Arrow Cross. In Zala, a 
county consisting largely of  small villages that had been particularly hard hit by 
the pillaging of  the Soviet soldiers, the Communist Party had little chance of  any 
similar attainments. A picture begins to emerge of  the workers as a class that was 
politically active during the war. Disinterest in politics was rare among workers 
who, some decades later, would sometimes have to explain to their descendants 
what the word “strike” meant (though it’s true that in the meantime workers had 
found other means of  holding back production).13 The book offers illuminating 
comparisons of  why the Communist rhetoric, which hammered in the notion 
that the Communists had arrived as liberators, was received differently in each 
of  the three places in question and how the workers’ strikes in the summer and 
autumn of  1945, soon before the elections, influenced people’s assessments of  
the party. 
According to Pittaway, the elections that were held in November 1945 
shattered the Communists’ illusion that they would rise to power without any 
kind of  transition and with the backing of  the Soviets. After the elections, the 
Communist Party was compelled to make proposals to the working class that 
would help it win their support. However, whether or not a political party enjoyed 
support depended not on the promises it made, but rather on its credibility. 
The results of  the 1947 elections were more favorable for the Communists 
specifically because they found themselves in the opposition in 1945. The voters 
13  Cf. Lajos Héthy and Csaba Makó, Munkásmagatartások és gazdasági szervezet [Worker Behavior and 
Economic Organization] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972).
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of  Tatabánya or Újpest did not have more faith in the Communists because 
the Communists had made enticing promises, but rather because the governing 
parties, which had a penchant for populist pledges, were not able to make good 
on their promises. On the local level, members of  the social democratic party 
were seen as people who were close to the institutions of  power (pp.67–8). This 
enabled the Communist Party to win considerable support in industrial districts 
in 1947. Pittaway does not explain this as a consequence of  national political 
developments. He does not characterize the period between 1945 and 1948 as 
an attempt to create a state founded on the rule of  law, but rather as years in 
which the Communists used populist tools to attempt to win support for their 
goals among a segment of  society. In his assessment, the decisions of  viewers 
were influenced by local experiences and circumstances on the shop floor (rises 
in wages, a strike, a local demonstration, for instance on May 1, 1946 in Újpest, 
when the Hungarian Communist Party and the Hungarian Socialist Democratic 
Party together managed to mobilize 25,000 people). At the same time, there is 
still room for further research. Pittaway analyzes the election data on smaller 
settlements, but he does not attempt to explain why the differences were so 
striking between individual villages (in the case of  the county of  Zala) and parts 
of  the city (in the case of  Tatabánya). As is the case with the results of  the 1947 
elections, these differences cannot be explained simply as a result of  voter fraud.
The third chapter (which examines the period between 1947 and 1949) may 
well give rise to numerous differences of  opinion among Hungarian historians 
who are debating the significance of  1949, a year often regarded as a turning 
point. The title of  the chapter (Social Roots of  Dictatorship) is in itself  provocative, 
since it implies that the dictatorship was not simply an aberrance that was 
concocted in the witch’s kitchen of  the Communist Party and imposed by the 
Soviets. Pittaway examines the measures that were taken in order to win some 
social support in the course of  the creation of  the dictatorship. Through the use 
of  populist rhetoric, the party managed to gain acceptance for the appointment 
of  workers’ directors and the nationalization of  factories (which according to 
the Communists had been ruthless exploited by the capitalists and had finally 
found trustworthy caregivers in the state) without even having to rely on the 
State Security, effectively the secret police (pp.86–8). One could mention, for 
instance, the “potato crisis” in Tatabánya, which involved a strike that broke out 
in Tatabánya because of  the shortage of  potatoes (which in the 1950s were one 
of  the primary foodstuffs). In the course of  the strike the local organization 
of  the Hungarian Communist Party blamed “speculators” (implicitly “Jewish 
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speculators”) for the shortage. With nationalization and this anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, the Hungarian Communist Party managed to gain significant support 
in Tatabánya. 
This political popularity disappeared rapidly, however, when the workers 
found themselves in the world not of  visions and promises, but rather of  
economic measures adopted by a party, the Communist Party, that found itself  
compelled to increase economic efficiency. On the level of  the factory floors, 
the greatest conflict was caused by the introduction of  a system of  wages 
based on the Soviet model, which on the local level meant the end of  populist 
communism (though it did not prevent the reproduction of  class hierarchy). A 
mining accident in Tatabánya on December 30, 1950 that was caused indirectly 
by measures taken to increase production had a permanent effect on attitudes 
towards the Rákosi system in the community (p.130). The most interesting and 
most valuable parts of  the book are Pittaway’s analyses of  the similarities and 
differences between the three areas, Újpest, Tatabánya and Zala. He reveals 
differences in micro-communities that for the most part would remain indistinct, 
homogenous masses in macro-analyses, for instance the industrial working class 
itself, the different layers of  which have been ascribed with varying significances 
in the creation of  the socialist system. 
László Varga and Gyula Belényi have already studied the conflicts between 
the “new,” “transitional” workers14 (rural, young, often female) and the old, 
trained workers in Hungary.15 Pittaway’s monograph, however, is the first work 
of  scholarship to examine how, after 1956, the Kádár government was compelled 
because of  these conflicts to establish legitimacy for itself  in an entirely new 
social milieu, as well as the tools it used in the service of  this goal. Pittaway 
touches on sensitive questions. The workers of  Újpest who on October 23, 1956 
radicalized the demonstration by the youth (p.209) and later took active part in 
the organization of  the workers’ councils were among the first to be given raises 
in 1957. In 1957 workers’ wages were increased by 18 percent (p.233), although 
this in and of  itself  was not adequate to ensure support for the Kádár system 
among a significant segment of  the working class. According to Pittaway, the 
answer to the question of  why the government was not compelled on May 1 
14  On the “transitional types of  workers” see László Pethő, “A vidéki munkásság antropológiája” [An 
Anthropology of  the Rural Working Class], in Paraszti múlt és jelen az ezredfordulón [Peasant Past and Present 
at the Turn of  the Millennium], ed. Miklós Cseri, László Kósa, and Ibolya T. Bereczki (Szentendre: Magyar 
Néprajzi Társaság–Szentendrei Szabadtéri Néprajzi Múzeum, 2000), 423–42.
15  Belényi, Az állam szorításában; Varga, Az elhagyott tömeg.
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to use the workers’ militia to get workers to participate in the parades and why 
János Kádár himself  did not fear an attempt on his life during the celebrations 
lies in the shrewd mix of  the official rhetoric and a politics focused on standards 
of  living. 
Mark Pittaway’s monograph occupies a place of  distinction not only in the 
scholarship on the political engagement of  the industrial workers in Hungary, 
but in the research on the history of  the industrial workers in Europe. It situates 
the attempt to create Socialism in Hungary in an international context and thus 
provides a point of  departure for further comparative study. Pittaway’s research, 
work that spanned a decade and a half, has revitalized scholarship on the subject, 
which had been increasingly marginalized in the historiography.16 In all likelihood 
his monograph will influence research on the lives and experiences of  industrial 
workers, who represented the largest social bloc and whose living conditions 
should therefore be in the forefront of  scholarship on the era, for decades.
Sándor Horváth 
16  See the special issue of  the International Review of  Social History. Marcel van der Linden, ed., The End of  
Labour History? 38, no. 1 (1993).
